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In a recent paper, Mark Wilson observes that “applied mathematicians are often forced to pursue roundabout and shakily rationalized expedients if any progress is to be made” (2000a, 296). Philosophers of science, accordingly, must not limit their attention to a small set of principle theories and their standard models – or to a few basic equations under idealized boundary conditions – but take into account how poorly applied mathematics performs in physically realistic situations. Instead of echoing Eugene P. Wigner’s (1960) praise of the “Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”, they rather confront the “Unreasonable Uncooperativeness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences” – so reads Wilson’s title. But what is the philosophical lesson to be drawn from the failure of classical accounts of explanation in the face of macroscopic fluids in a pipe, fracturing solid bodies, and the like?
Deductive-nomological explanations will not do because they cannot accommodate the “shakily rationalized expedients” characteristic for most actual applications of mathematics in the form of a set of basic axioms. But, so Wilson continues, currently popular anti-realist and anti-unificationist accounts overshoot the mark because – similarly as the received view of Logical Empiricism challenged by them – they presuppose a lazy form of mathematical optimism according to which “every real-life physical structure can [a priori] be expected to possess a suitable direct representative within the world of mathematics” (2000a, 297). In view of the many mismatches between mathematics and physics, however, lazy optimism and the talk about mathematics as “the science of all possible structures” (2000c, 143) become untenable. Rejecting them, however, does not leave applied mathematicians with empty hands when facing the complexities of the physical world. There is an alternative strategy to anti-realist surrender: mathematical opportunism. “It is the job of the applied mathematician to look out for the special circumstances that allow mathematics to say something useful about physical behavior” (2000a, 297). Mathematical opportunism “is based upon the belief that the successes of applied mathematics require some alien element that cannot be regarded as invariably present in the physical world” (Ibid., 299). 
There still exists, however, an honest version of mathematical optimism that proves quite resilient to refutation. After diagnosing the lack of a suitable mathematical structure to treat a physical problem, the optimist can try to liberalize mathematical ontology so as to include all physically possible solutions, not only those which are regular, smooth, or whatever conditions the mathematician might consider as “natural” or “tractable”. Wilson credits Leonhard Euler for developing this attitude. 
Within modern mathematics David Hilbert’s optimism that every mathematical problem can be cast in such a form that it admits a definitive solution, has become most influential. He even set out to prove in an absolute sense that optimism was always possible, albeit hard to cash in practically. But Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems showed that Hilbert’s foundationalist program was unfeasible, at least in its original form. Yet for the working honest optimist, the value of Hilbert’s axiomatic method as a machinery for studying mathematical ontology and conceptual frameworks of the sciences​[1]​ was hardly touched by that. John von Neumann (1932), consequently, published an axiomatization of quantum mechanics based on earlier work with Hilbert and L. Nordheim. His book was very influential on practicing mathematical physicists long before von Neumann (1947) himself presented an opportunist reinterpretation of the axiomatic method. 
It is a major merit of Wilson’s approach that he does not present an a priori argument for opportunism, but rather argues against taking optimism a priori for granted. It is important not to be misled by his organizing papers around historical disagreements between mathematicians. Wilson’s point is a methodological one and the same dramatis personae may well have pursued an opportunist strategy with respect to one problem and an optimist strategy with respect to another.
	In the present paper, I shall argue that the difficulty to refute honest mathematical optimism is a generic one because the mathematization viz. the axiomatization of a scientific theory can itself be performed in a rather opportunistic fashion. In this way opportunism is pulled back from the application of mathematical structures to the axiomatic set-up of these structures. On this account, which I call ‘opportunistic axiomatics’ and for which I credit John von Neumann, mathematical optimism and mathematical opportunism appear as two modes of a single strategy whose relative weight is determined by the present status of the field to be investigated. If a scientific theory has already reached conceptual maturity, one can attempt to rigorously rebuild the theory as it stands. If a field is still provisional in its basic concepts, and experience with models is fragmentary, the axiomatic method is able to act as a controlling instance and steering device for further exploration. For, opportunistic axiomatics is neither committed to a foundationalist program that aspires at establishing the consistency of the theory in an absolute sense, nor must the theory be considered final by the scientists. Assuming either of these goals would lead back to the opposition between the received view and anti-realism. 
So far, opportunistic axiomatics may seem to be rather a reformulation of Wilson’s mathematical opportunism that shifts the “shakily rationalized” practices into the theory’s structural make-up. But, so I shall argue, this shift has philosophical consequences when it comes to evaluating the success of models in applied mathematics. 
[I]t may happen that no interpretative scheme exists that can harmonize the disparate elements introduced in the modeling in anything other than a patently artificial manner. Hidden in the disparity between the unblended ingredients there may lurk some descriptive dissonance or incompleteness that is alien to the physical world (Wilson 2000a, 305). 
The necessity of such a distant treatment [based on ‘alien’ subsidiary conditions] seems to arise from a basic ‘rigidity’ in mathematical method. But if the physical world rolls along happily enough through all this – it’s just that applied mathematics must pause sometimes to catch up with it (Ibid., 313). 

Although there is undoubtedly a rift between mathematical and physical ontology, it seems to me that Wilson’s repeated references to the ‘physical world’ bear dangers that are unnecessary in order to imbibe the most important insights of his investigations into applied mathematics. 
At bottom, the alternative between mathematical optimism and mathematical opportunism concerns the relationship between two levels of mathematical structure: the core and the satellite equations, or equations and their boundary conditions. Opportunistic axiomatics never makes direct reference to a physical world that is void of any mathematical structure because it integrates the shakily rationalized practices into the set-up itself. In particular, it permits one to devise sophisticated logical cycles through which one can precisely describe the limits of a scientific theory. In this vein, one may consider different satellite equations on a par with different representations of a fundamental group or algebra of the kind used in quantum physics. While under certain conditions they are equivalent and the choice among them is just a matter of mathematical convenience, in general the selection between inequivalent representations will be a combination of what is required by the physical situation plus a well-considered dose of mathematical opportunism. In this way, one can precisely mark out the realm where opportunism and its kin have their final say.
Von Neumann held that the success of a theory is mainly evaluated according to pragmatic criteria, such as simplicity and fruitfulness. In addition to them, mathematics proper possesses criteria that concern the structural make-up. Thus, opportunistic axiomatics moves more smoothly between physics and mathematics, whereas mathematical opportunism is at bottom confronted with two types of questions about ‘gappines’; on the one hand, the question “of whether mathematics can capture the nature of the physical propagation process by devices natural to mathematics” (Wilson, 2000c, 146); on the other hand, when we discover, as did opportunist René Descartes, that a blob of milk spreading across a table has certain general invariants, “whatever physical process it is that propels spilt milk forward, it will not embody a mechanism that can enforce the ‘global rigidity’ of restricted line crossings required if physical description by algebraic equations were viable” (Ibid., 145). To the optimistically minded Neumannian opportunist, sometimes the lack of internal coherence asserted by Wilson might be simply a consequence of what counts as mathematically ‘natural’ or as a genuine ‘physical mechanism’.
Returning to the realism issue, opportunistic axiomatics sticks to Carnap’s teaching that only empirical realism, the internal question about the existence of certain entities within a linguistic framework, is meaningful. Unlike Carnap’s approach, however, it is not committed to the strict verificationist criterion of meaning. Opportunistic axiomatics is optimistic that for all physical questions a suitable conceptual framework can be found because it leaves a precisely defined leeway for model selection practices. Especially in the early stages of a research field, opportunistic axiomatics will be openly opportunist because it does not yet consider the framework in which it operates as satisfactory. 
Wilson’s mathematical opportunism and von Neumann’s opportunistic axiomatics share the conviction that there is no air-tight border line – as Wigner (1960) had assumed – between structure-oriented mathematical physics and tool-oriented applied mathematics. In a Hilbert-von Neumann perspective, mathematical physics, viz. the axiomatic method, takes the conceptual framework as provided by scientists as axioms and checks their independence and consistency. But it also aims at ‘deepening the foundations’ of these theories. Wilson, on the other hand, rightly emphasizes that many techniques developed in applied mathematics either prove useful for later conceptual investigations or the reason why they did work represents an important discovery.

1. Honest Optimism: The Vibrating String and the Dirichlet Principle

Wilson illustrates the clash between optimism and opportunism by the dispute between Jean d’Alembert and Leonhard Euler over the equation for a vibrating string. While Euler, the optimist, considered any mapping between ordinate and abscissa as a legitimate candidate to solve the equation, “d’Alembert concluded, in an admirably opportunist spirit, that although the bent string represent a genuine physical possibility, mathematics cannot expect to treat such a case and must restrict its attention to strings that are regular enough to possess second derivatives.” (2000a, 298) More generally, while the received view considers the physically relevant structures as a subset of the mathematical ones​[2]​, to the opportunist, the amenable mathematical structures sometimes constitute a proper subset of all physically desirable objects. Wilson rephrases d’Alembert’s reservations as follows.

Claims about infinitesimal relationships as embodied in the wave equations make sense only if they represent limiting distillates of some global regularity displayed in the macroscopic behavior at hand. … But there is no reason why nature should need, except by accident, to exhibit the required macroscopic regularity in its doing. (Ibid.)

Here the lazy and the honest mathematical optimist part company. The former is simply convinced – be it on philosophical or other grounds – that mathematical ontology can be suitably extended, the latter supplies the formal means to do so. Euler’s optimism became honest by proving how an otherwise unknown function can be grown directly from the differential equation. 
A similar story can be told for the Dirichlet principle. It allows me to bring Hilbert into the game. For the physicists of the late 19th century the principle asserted that for any closed curve in space there is a surface of least energy that spans it. After Karl Weierstraß’ criticism, mathematicians realized that it was very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to prove what physicists intuitively took for granted. And some of the rigorous solutions they eventually obtained, exhibited properties that were far from physicists’ expectations. 
In three of his famous 23 Problems, Hilbert filed his plea for honest optimism for the entire discipline of variational calculus where the difficulties, that had emerged around the Dirichlet principle, were quite generic.​[3]​ There existed a certain trade-off. Not every variational problem was mathematically well-defined within a given class of possible solutions, but if a solution existed then it was often much ‘nicer’, viz. continuous to a higher order, than the class with which one had started. 
The 19th Problem dealt with variational functionals whose integrand was even analytic; Hilbert called them regular and asked whether this property carried over to the solutions. “Does every lagrangian partial differential equation of a regular variation problem have the property of admitting analytic integrals exclusively?” (1900, 469). Just four years later, Serge Bernstein showed that this was true if the solutions satisfied some requirements on their first three derivatives. Finding such a priori estimates became a standard technique in the field. “Still, as Enrico Bombieri said in his address to the International Congress of Mathematicians in 1974, where he was awarded a Fields Medal for his work in the area, ‘the search for such estimates in the non-linear case is still more of an art than a method’.” (Gray, 2000, 122) Bombieri here emphasizes the unavoidability of mathematical opportunism if one intends to arrive at solutions that have ‘nice’ properties.
Hilbert’s 20th Problem was more optimist in spirit. “Has not every regular variation problem a solution, provided certain assumptions regarding the given boundary conditions are satisfied …, and provided also if need be that the notion of a solution shall be suitably extended?”(1900, 470). And in the 23rd Problem, Hilbert sketched a new approach to variational calculus that made the structure of the field of all possible solutions much more transparent and incorporated Weierstraß’ sufficient conditions for a minimum of the variational functional. On this line substantial ‘ontological’ progress would be made.
To sum up, in variational calculus the honest optimist has to make precise among which class of possible functions the solution is to be found. To this end, she can avail herself of a rather general conceptual framework, but when the choice of this class leads to different outcomes the honest optimist has no scruples to make some rather opportunistic moves. There are cases where one cannot dismiss out of hand d’Alembert’s worries that mathematical ontology might be too restrictive to encompass all physically meaningful models. But there are also cases where the opportunist happily relies upon excess mathematical structure which is not physically meaningful. The problem of a ball rolling on a surface without slip – a classic in the history of mechanics – contains two non-holonomic constraints. To obtain the right equations of motion from the obvious variational principle, one has first to vary over motions with slip and then impose the constraints. Thus the set of possible solutions contains solutions which are not physically admissible. If one proceeds otherwise the mathematics gets stuck in such a way that no opportunist supplementary condition can help. 

2. Core Equations – Satellite Equations

Our philosophical upbringing often encourages a rather static view of mathematical ontology: “As soon as the axioms of set theory are accepted and assigned the standard model, then all of mathematics’ substructures will lie firmly in place.” But such a jingle suppresses the fact that we often need to articulate an interpretative scheme that allows us to see why a particular assemblage of elements should be considered as introducing a coherent mathematical object worthy of the label ‘structure’. (Wilson 2000a, 304f.)

Perhaps, those targeted by Wilson only read physics textbooks which typically limit considerations to the standard models.​[4]​ But the working physicist typically encounters non-standard problems and embarks onto handwaving simplifications and limits. Applied mathematics is mostly about separating those procedures into voodoo and mathematically meaningful approximations. In Newtonian mechanics – taken in the wider sense of all physics consistent with the three axioms – the standard procedure is to

start with a set of general infinitesimal relationships (of “F=ma” type) applicable to all materials as well as a special set of laws that dictate how particular types of matter will respond to external influences. We then design a modeling to a particular portion of the universe by declaring that such and such materials are present; the set of laws automatically dictate how these modeling assumptions convert into a set of differential equations to govern the material at hand. We obtain a set of core equations that, if they are supplied both initial and adequate boundary conditions, will dictate how the material will evolve over time. …[But] the frequent recalcitrance of these “core” differential equations … forces applied mathematicians to switch to … sundry satellite problems from which information can be more readily extracted. (Ibid., 306)

Take a rock placed on a post. As the core equations are too hard to deal with, applied mathematicians switch to the satellite problem of a post in equilibrium. 

No longer do we attempt to predict the final state of the post by mathematically tracking its ongoing temporal evolution, watching its kinetic energy gradually ebb away. Instead we demurely turn our gaze away from the post for a decent interval and calculate what its shape might possibly be after the messy process of energy loss has been completed. (Ibid., 307)

This is outright opportunism. In contrast, “Eulerian mathematical optimism is premised upon the assumption that ‘core equation’ descriptions will exist for every physical process and that their behavior, in principle, can rationalize the equilibrium tricks.”(Ibid.) The honest optimist cannot just contemplate the set of all possible satellite equations because this optimism would be as tautologous as securing the principle of causality by means of ascribing particular laws of nature to each point in space-time (See Schlick 1920). To avoid meaningless metaphysical claims, the honest optimist must attempt to “justify most of the stock transitions between core and satellite equations rigorously” (Wilson, 2000a, 307f.). What Logical Empiricists and their offspring neglected is that finding these transitions is often so hard that the concept of logical subservience becomes useless if not vacuous. 
Let me cite another example of Wilson’s to show that the problem is more general than temporarily suspending dynamical evolution or determinism. The core equations of fluid mechanics, the Navier-Stokes equations, can be tracked numerically only for a very short time even on the best available computers. However, in Prandtl’s boundary layer theory, “by taking limits, the N-S equations can be simplified in two different ways, according to whether we are looking near the fluid’s boundaries or towards the middle of the flow.” (2000b, 378) Wilson rightly emphasizes that Prandtl’s theory does not possess axioms, but rather represents a technique. But the goal of the axiomatic method in the Hilbert-von Neumann sense does not necessarily consist in finding a unique axiom system that governs all satellite equations and techniques through a complete classification scheme. Rather does opportunist axiomatics supply a rigorous platform for a critical evaluation of Prandtl’s theory. In virtue of the axiomatic framework both satellite equations belong to a (complex) class of models given by the original core equation. This also backs the claim that they express the same physical phenomenon, a flow in a pipe. Otherwise this identification must be made by reference to the unmathematized physical world, such that we earn ourselves the question whether the satellite equations really describe any physical phenomenon at all.

3. Boundary value problems

There is another feature inherent to problems like Dirichlet’s where Hilbertian optimism has a harder stand. Wilson discloses that “it is the sour recalcitrance that PDEs [partial differential equations] frequently display in reaching harmonious accommodation with their boundary conditions that inspired the ‘unreasonable uncooperativeness’ in the title of this essay.” (2000a, 310) While in the case of initial conditions one can start with arbitrary (or at least measure-theoretically typical) values and let the system evolve dynamically, all boundary conditions, on pain of unsolvability, must be completely specified and accorded with the dynamical equations. “We must look for opportunities in nature where boundary conditions can be laid down beforehand.” (Ibid., 309) These boundaries need not be constant over time; traveling shock waves, for instance, are singular surfaces that separate two types of solutions. While shock waves are physically observable phenomena, other surfaces need not. 
Here is an opportunist’s scheme for fracturing objects.

Track the normal uncracked evolution of the material using the unvarnished core equations, but, as you do so, introduce imaginary infinitesimal cracks in each region and check whether their sizes will prove stable against enlargement. If it turns out that it is energetically advantageous for the cracks to grow, we can presume the material will likely crack somewhere within the affected regions, although it is usually unpredictable exactly where they will appear. We then overrule the smooth evolution provided by the bar’s “core equations” and simply wait until the real-life material actually fractures before we restart tracking the bar’s behavior forward in time. That is, a positive result on [A.A.] Griffiths’ crack enlargement test instructs us to stop watching the bar’s development mathematically and wait for it on the other side of the “already cracked” stile. We must patiently loiter until nature supplies us with a new set of boundary opportunities. …
To me, the tantalizing formal aspect of a Griffiths-style treatment is that, although Eulerian evolutionary equations remain involved in the account, they are no longer treated as fully “core”: instead, stability tests logically reminiscent of those employed in the equilibrium of a loaded post have been superadded. In the Griffiths treatment we no longer straightforwardly model the evolution of the material object; rather we continually monitor a reference modeling to see whether a discontinuous shift in the modeling needs to be introduced. … Applied mathematics has here retreated from providing a direct description of nature and replaced it by a methodology subtly tagged to the opportunistic appearance of structures that can be temporarily exploited as boundaries. (Wilson, 2000a, 312f.)

Fair enough, but the optimist subscribing to opportunistic axiomatics does not have to sit and wait in indolence. Recognizing that the core equations have to be supplemented with stability tests and that virtual displacements are a standard technique in mathematical physics, she would analyze the conceptual framework and modify it in such a way that the concept of stability attains a more prominent role in virtue of its occurrence in different core equations, which, accordingly, lose their primary ‘core’ status. In Hilbert’s terms, this introduction of the equilibrium concept amounts to ‘deepening the foundations’.​[5]​ 
Wilson gives another nice example of ‘deepening the foundations’. Euler’s algorithm for the numerical study of differential equations works only if a Lipschitz condition holds which, geometrically speaking, limits the extent to which two solutions can flee from one another. The purely opportunist Euler algorithm has accordingly become robust and trustworthy “in the sense that the method’s failures can now be confined to equations where the Lipschitz condition fails.” (2000b, 384). Mathematicians after Euler deepened the foundations of the theory of ordinary differential equations when they found that the Lipschitz condition is the key element in the existence and uniqueness theorem for ordinary differential equations.​[6]​
	The most important point here is that these honest optimist modifications of the axiomatic framework, viz. of mathematical ontology, can be justified in a purely pragmatic manner that comes rather close to – but is not identical with – Rudolf Carnap’s (1950) theory of linguistic frameworks. There are three points of convergence between Wilson’s approach and the Carnap’s framework ontology. (i) The core equation and the other axioms define what counts as empirically real (in Carnap’s sense). (ii) By rigorous limit procedures, or by just dropping terms, the opportunist defines satellite equations within this framework. This provides them with a well-entrenched internal reality. (iii) The physical identification of two satellite equations – beyond the fact that they stem from the same core equation – might require introducing a further opportunist condition. This condition might propel us to introduce a predicate of higher order or even to deepen the foundations of the framework, because the optimist must turn the suitable objects into linguistically possible and technically controllable structures. 
But, there are significant differences between the Carnapian setting, on the one hand, and Wilson’s approach and opportunistic axiomatics, on the other hand. (iv) Since there is no prior warranty that the optimist strategy (iii) succeeds, the framework of opportunistic axiomatics will not be a total one because pragmatic criteria will play an irreducible role also inside the framework, not only in its selection. (v) Moreover, there will be no hermetic separation between mathematical and physical ontology, as Carnap’s meaning criterion assumed. 
To be sure, the framework, core and satellite equations, and the opportunist techniques must be empirically adequate. The advantage of opportunistic axiomatics, however, is that empirical adequacy is the only point where contact with the physical world is made. We do not have to ascribe properties to the world that in principle cannot be mathematized. In this respect my conclusion is more radical than Wilson’s dismissal of anti-realism: avoid the realism debate as much as possible. After all, applied mathematicians are always concerned with already mathematized physics. In the following section, I shall show how the Hilbert-von Neumann tradition arrives at the convictions (i)-(v) and then investigate how its criteria of trustworthiness relate to those proposed by Wilson. 

4. Von Neumann’s Opportunistic Axiomatics

There is a remarkable continuity in von Neumann’s methodology. In 1932 he laid the mathematical foundations of a physical theory that had already attained conceptual maturity although it was – and still is – notoriously plagued with interpretational problems. His Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics became both a major point of reference for philosophical debates and a most influential model for present-day mathematical physics. Yet only a few contemporaries noticed that his optimistic strategy led him into infinite-dimensional quantum systems and what later became called Type II von Neumann algebras because the foundations of his brainchild Hilbert space could still be deepened. (Cf. Rédei, 1996). 
When in 1944 von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their trail-blazing Theory of Games and Economic Behavior they neither could build upon well-entrenched scientific concepts nor were they equipped with a ready-to-use mathematical theory. Accordingly, the Introduction surmises that in economics “mathematical discoveries of a stature comparable to that of calculus will be needed in order to produce decisive success in this field” (1947, 6). For the time being, scientists should strive at a mathematically precise formulation of elementary facts about simple games and try to extend them to more realistic situations. Only a combination of exact mathematical and empirical studies will tell whether principles and concepts are sound. Optimism and opportunism, accordingly, must cooperate.
	Both the foundational and the exploratory aspect were already present in Hilbert’s axiomatic method, although Hilbert considered the axiomatization of phenomenological theories as only transitory. Still, this doublefacedness suffices to recognize the important difference between the axiomatic method and the claim that a particular axiom system represents the most perfect formulation of a given fundamental theory (Cf. Majer 2001). For Hilbert, the virtue of the axiomatic method was based on the undivided nature of mathematical knowledge and his firm belief that after appropriate specialization all problems are solvable.​[7]​ Both these virtues would have followed from the success of his foundationalist program, but especially the first does not depend upon it.
	Von Neumann was among the first to realize that Hilbert’s program to actually prove optimism had run shipwreck with Gödel’s results. In three methodological papers written after 1947 he gave Hilbert’s axiomatic method an opportunist and pragmatist tack. 

The main hope for justification of classical mathematics – in the sense of Hilbert or of Brouwer and Weyl – being gone, most mathematicians decided to use that system any​way. After all, classical mathematics … stood on at least as sound a foundation as, for ex​ample, the existence of the electron (1947, 6).

Nonetheless, mathematics “establishes certain standards of objectivity, certain standards of truth … rather independently of everything else” (1954, 478). This objectivity does not contradict the historical fact that many non-rigorous arguments were accepted. Rather does history teach a lesson about the relationship between mathematics and the sciences. “The variability of the concept of rigor shows that something else besides mathematical abstraction must enter into the makeup of mathematics” (1947, 4). Here the sciences come into play. “The most vitally characteristic fact about mathematics is … its quite peculiar relationship … to any science which inter​prets experience on a higher than purely descriptive level” (Ibid., 1). This re​la​tion​ship has two sides: On the one side, “throughout the natural sciences an unbroken chain of pseudo​mor​phoses, all of them pressing toward mathematics, and almost identified with the idea of scientific progress, has become more and more evident.” (Ibid., 2) This was Hilbert’s standard argument for the central role of mathematics in the sciences. On the other side, “[s]ome of the best inspirations of modern mathematics (I believe, the best ones) clearly originated in the natural sciences” (Ibid.). 
For instance, calculus – Newton’s fluxions in particular – was explicitly created for the purpose of celestial mechanics. “An inexact, semiphysical formulation was the only one available for over a hundred and fifty years after Newton!” (Ibid., 3) Despite major advances, “[t]he development was as confused and ambiguous as can be … And even after the reign of rigor was essentially re-established with Cauchy, a very peculiar relapse into semiphysical methods took place with Riemann.” (Ibid., 3f.) Hence, those scientific theories which cannot avail them​selves of previously created mathematical structures are likely to incite their own mathematics that sets out in a rather informal way. Yet, “[t]here are various important parts of modern mathematics in which the empirical origin is untraceable” (Ibid., 6), such as topology or abstract algebra. Differential geometry and group theory “were certainly conceived as abstract, nonapplied disciplines. … After a decade in one case, and a century in the other, they turned out to be very useful in physics. And they are still mostly performed in the in​di​cated, abstract, nonapplied spirit.” (Ibid., 7) Hence, there must be specific and self-contained mathematical criteria of success which, on the other hand, permit a rather smooth transition from empirical science to mathematics. 
To von Neumann, the prevailing attitude in science is opportunism: the sciences “mainly make models” (1955, 492) which are valid over limited scales only. “The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work” (Ibid.), its empirical adequacy. Conceived in this opportunist spirit, mathematics and theoretical physics share many criteria of success.
[T]he criterion of success of such a theory is simply whether it can, by a simple and elegant classifying and correlating scheme, cover very many phenomena, which without this scheme would seem complicated and heterogeneous, and whether this scheme covers phenomena which were not considered at the time when the scheme was evolved. (1947, 7)

Accordingly, simplicity and unificationary power have to be constantly equilibrated. Von Neumann emphasizes that both these criteria are “clearly to a great extent of an aesthetical nature” (Ibid.) which brings them rather close to the genuine mathematical criteria of success.
“One expects a mathematical theorem or a mathematical theory not only to describe and to classify in a simple and elegant way. … One also expects ‘elegance’ in its ‘architectural’, structural makeup” (1947, 9), e.g., a surprising twist in the argument, or some general principle which reduces the apparent arbitrariness. At this point 
the subject begins to live a particular life of its own and is better compared to a creative one, governed by almost entirely aesthetical motivations, than to anything else and in particular, to an empirical science. … As a mathematical discipline travels far from its empirical source … it is beset with very grave dangers. It becomes more and more purely aestheticizing, more and more purely l’art pour l’art (Ibid.). 

During this decline, one might say, too many and too specific aesthetic criteria of what counts as mathematically ‘natural’ emerge. This makes life hard for the mathematical optimist. According to Neumann, “whenever this stage is reached, the only remedy seems … to be a rejuvenating return to the source: the reinjection of more or less directly empirical ideas” (Ibid.). Notice that the diagnosis of degeneration is reached by internal criteria of mathematical style or elegance, only, and not by gaps in the application of mathematics. Thus, one cannot derive from these remarks a methodo​logical restriction of the independence of mathematics. After all, “the principle of laissez faire has led to strange and wonderful results” (1954, 490) once one had completely forgotten “about what one ultimately wanted” (Ibid., 489).
	The continuous transition of pragmatic criteria between the empirical sciences and mathematics represents a significant departure from the Carnapian setting. In particular, there is no basis for globally and hermetically separating the ontologies of (analytic) mathematics and (synthetic) physics. Nevertheless, opportunistic axiomatics achieves what Carnap had intended, the elimination of pseudo-problems. And its does so precisely because of the enormous flexibility of mathematics “in the formation of concepts, a degree of flexibility to which it is very difficult to arrive in a non-mathematical mode” (Ibid., 482). This flexibility has three aspects. First, after mathe​matization has revealed formal equivalencies or isomorphisms between two com​peting approaches, certain philosophical problems connected to them become simply meaningless. Second, mathematization makes it possible to for​mulate some sophisticated ‘logical cycles’ within and to find the absolute limita​tions of a theory. Third, beyond the models on which a particular axiomatization is based, mathematization may provide a certain excess content that can become heuristically fertile for scientific insight. Let me now turn to von Neumann’s examples.
(a) Problems in classical mechanics can either be investigated by a second-order differential equation which locally describes the dynamical evolution or globally by the Principle of Least Action which 
asserts that this entire historical process must satisfy certain criteria which are usually stated in terms of optimizing (maximizing) a suitable function of the process. The use of the word optimizing again illustrates the opportunism that even re​flects itself in the terminology. By optimizing one only means that one makes some quan​tity as large as possible. Whether that quantity is particularly desirable or not does not mat​ter. By changing its sign one could transform the criterion in making it as small as possible. (1955, 495).

The teleological connotation of the Principle of Least Action was occasionally interpreted as backward causation. But, this is a meaningless pseudo-problem because

[a]ll the difference between the two [approaches] is a purely mathematical transformation … This … proves, that if one has really technically penetrated a subject, things that previously seemed in complete contrast, might be purely mathematical transformations of each other. Things which appear to represent deep differences of principle and of interpretation, in this way may turn out not to affect any significant statements and any predictions. (Ibid., 496).

That a classical metaphysical problem has become meaningless by reducing it to a mathematical isomorphism, represents major progress for the mathematical optimist. Unfortunately, the honest optimist von Neumann has become a bit lazy here. Although the strict equivalence between the causal and the teleological approach holds for the standard examples of classical mechanics, there exist problems that fulfill Newton’s axioms, but for which the Principle of Least Action does not yield the proper solution. On the other hand, the same differential equation may stem from several inequivalent action principles.
(b) Quantum theory can be formulated in two different settings, the Schrödinger and the Heisenberg representation. Von Neumann himself could prove that in quantum mechanics – not in quantum field theory – they are equivalent up to isomorphism. He associates both representations with an interpretative scheme and concludes that
while there appears to be a serious philosophical controversy between the interpretations of Schrödinger [based on the wave picture] and Heisenberg [which is completely probabilistic], it is quite likely that the controversy will be settled in quite an unphilosophical way[;] … this is not a question of accepting the correct theory and rejecting the false one. It is a matter of accepting that theory which shows greater formal adaptability for a correct extension. This is a formalistic, esthetic criterion, with a highly opportunistic flavor (1955, 498). 

Whether the axioms uniquely (up to isomorphism) determine the models, viz. the possible physical theories is a major concern for the mathematical optimist because it measures the quality of her framework. If uniqueness fails, unintended models can pop up, such as the Skolem functions in ordinary number theory. For mathematical physics in general, non-uniqueness is rather the generic case. Thus on pain of lazy optimism due attention for the single models remains essential.
Moreover, it requires already a good deal of mathematical sophistication to properly formulate a single interpretation in quantum mechanics. While in Newtonian mechanics a complete specification of the state allowed causal predictions, in quantum theory one is left with probabilities.
There is, however, something else which is causally predictable, namely the so-called wave-function. The evolution of the wave-function can be calculated from one moment to the next, but the effect of the wave-function on observed reality is only probability … And again an enormous contribution of the mathematical method to the evolution of our real thinking is, that it has made such logical cycles possible, and has made them quite specific. It has made possible to do these things in complete reliability and with complete technical smoothness. (1954, 486)

Moreover, the mathematical language can describe its own domain of validity. In relativity and quantum theory, 

by the best descriptions we can give today, there are absolute limitations to what is knowable. However, they can be expressed mathematically very precisely, by concepts which would be very puzzling when attempted to be expressed by any other means. Thus, both in relativity and in quantum mechanics the things which cannot be known always exist; but you have a considerable latitude in controlling which ones they are … This is certainly a situation of a degree of sophistication which it would be completely hopeless to develop or to handle by other than mathematical methods (Ibid., 487).

More concretely, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations represent an absolute limitation to the simultaneous use of the concepts of position and momentum of a quantum particle. Once the linguistic framework of quantum mechanics is accepted, trespassing this border yields a meaningless problem of metaphysical realism. Like Carnap (1950), von Neumann emphasizes that choosing a conceptual framework is largely a pragmatic or aesthetic matter, but there is genuine space for pragmatic motives also inside the chosen framework. Moreover, both Hilbert and von Neumann did not consider mathematics as a tautologous manipulation with syntactic symbols. Otherwise the empirical inspirations of mathematics would boil down to mere heuristics. Von Neumann’s strong belief that finding the mathematical core of a theory chiefly contributes to scientific understanding, echoes Hilbert’s ‘deepening the foundations’ and is hardly reconcilable with the verificationist dogma. This is also a major issue in Wilson (1995) who criticizes the role of verificationism in a premature identification of mathematical structures by way of equivalence relations. Although von Neumann’s first example might be misread in such a way, even isomorphic theories may substantially differ in their heuristic content (pragmatism thus safeguards against a ‘Dedekind overkill’).
	If the models of an axiom system are not isomorphic, opportunistic arguments cut in to single out the ‘physical’ models, typically the solutions of the basic equations or the representations of a fundamental group. The easiest case are models labeled by parameter values, e.g., initial conditions or physical constants, which can be empirically determined. But already for partial differential equations the space of solutions is so more complex that one has to find subsidiary conditions. They range from general principles that can be considered as secondary laws of nature, such as the Cosmic Censorship Hypothesis supplementing Einstein’s equations, to requirements of stability – as in the above-mentioned case of fracture –, to conditions on the energy of the system, and, finally, to the “shakily rationalized expedients” mentioned by Wilson. 
In the case of fracture we forwent calculating the cracks of the bar, but the introduction of imaginary cracks and energy considerations allowed us to rigorously prove that the bar necessarily will crack somewhere. A similar strategy of opportunistically sacrificing explananda is widely used in statistical theories for the study of phase transitions and symmetry breakings. An oversaturated saline solution will necessarily crystallize, but we cannot calculate where the first crystallization germ will form. Spontaneous symmetry breakings are common in quantum mechanics of large systems or in quantum field theory where they are believed to be the mechanism for mass generation in the early Universe. In some cases, the mathematical theory of these mechanisms can be made very precise, in other cases, physicists resort to a set of opportunistic rules. But in each case physicists agree that symmetry breaking and phase transition are basic physical concepts rather than calculatory techniques, and that a general conceptual framework for them is needed. This is a problem of the kind opportunistic axiomatics can approach.

5. Realism and the Physical World

Let us turn to fracture once more. Wilson emphasizes that it teaches us that mathematics can catch up with the course of the physical world only at times. Fair enough, but talk about a physical world and its coherence can be misleading. After discussing fracture, Wilson continues: “As I understand them, ‘decoherentist’ approaches to quantum theory also rest upon an ‘opportunist’ philosophy of applied mathematics reminiscent of that illustrated here.” (2000a, 313) To be sure, these approaches might be called opportunistic in so far as the decoherence condition they add to the “core” mathematical formalism does not amount to an extra physical structure in the sense hidden variable theories do. But the analogy is flawed. Decoherentists do not deal with problems in which the “core” Schrödinger equation is difficult to solve. Rather are they – and most other alternative interpretations – motivated by the fact that quantum theory does not conform to a realist ontology. Speaking of the existence of a physical world between measurements, accordingly, commits one to a certain type of interpretation; it leads out of the formalism. 
Quantum theory, of course, displays the familiar problem of “collapse of the wave function”, where the mathematical modeling looks as if it must be re-calibrated from time to time by the insertion of extrinsic data. In effect we are noting that somewhat analogous, although subtler, worries tend to affect most differential equations used everywhere in physics, even within its most “purely classical” realms. (2000c, 149f.)

There are debates as to whether the collapse of the wave packet indeed constitutes a physical process and how it should be modeled. But the interaction with a measuring device is certainly no re-calibration by extrinsic data. Rather are measurement data what we expect to describe the “physical world”, and quantum troubles begin because the nice mathematics in-between cannot phrase them in an interpretation-free manner. My point here is not to press Wilson on remarks made in passing. Rather does quantum theory show drastically that even for the mathematical opportunist what counts as “physical world” may depend upon the “core” equations presupposed. 
The small dose of mathematical optimism contained in opportunist axiomatics avoids such a relapse into realism debates which can become quite obsessive in quantum mechanics. Von Neumann’s No-hidden variable theorem and Bell’s theorem were optimistic attempts to precisely describe possible physical ontologies. In the end, it were neither realists’ discomforts nor obstacles in solving the Schrödinger equation that spoke against the axioms of measurement proposed by von Neumann, but rather the fact that Bell provided a more general No-go theorem under weaker assumptions that was consistent with those newly found alternative models which reproduced the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics but violated one axiom of von Neumann. Opportunistic axiomatics has always to be ready to rethink the basic axioms. 

6. Trustworthiness and truth in opportunistic reasoning

In this final section I intend to show that Wilson’s bottom-up criteria of trustworthiness are the first step for both the opportunist and the optimist to get a grip on a problem. But after a certain point the higher trustworthiness or rigidity of axiomatics should sway even hard-boiled opportunist.

Most complete patterns of scientific reasoning involve many non-logical steps. To certify these as trustworthy, known facts about the argument’s setting, extracted from considerations that often range far afield of competency or understanding [which justify validity in the received optimist view], must allow us to build up a parochial notion of “truth condition” that permits the individual effects of the non-logical transitions to be tracked through the argument. (2000b, 377/8)

Take again the Euler algorithm and assume the Lipschitz condition as an a priori bound on how far the approximate solution y*(t) can depart from the ‘right’ solution y(t).
[W]e directly track how the informational contents of the sentences ground out by a run of the Euler algorithm correlate with the y(t) reality that the sentences hope to reflect. We therefore construct a plausible measure (the “distance” ) of the degree to which the Euler broken line stays in alignment with y(t). This is the “correlational point of view”: we objectively study how an unfolding reasoning process manages to arrange itself with respect to an independent reality. … This supplies a primitive notion of “truth condition” that is entirely erected upon the correspondences uncovered in our examination of the algorithm’s working. (Ibid., 384)

In contrast to the ‘competency chain doctrine’ criticized by Wilson, correctness is not judged according to some preexisting semantic standards, but by standards parochial to the problem. The only requirement is the non-circularity of the measure; in the case of the Euler algorithm this holds true because the distance  is a purely geometrical concept. 

It is rarely the case that a specific reasoning procedure will supply trustworthy results in all settings [as would be required for logical reasoning]; on the other hand, the knowledge we may require about the setting can be very minimal. (Ibid., 385)
Nothing scouted here requires that the notion of “truth” (or “approximate truth”) traced through a reasoning process is uniquely defined. Indeed the “approximate truth” of the Euler calculation can be measured by a variety of inequivalent norms. (Ibid., 387)

It appears to me that this non-uniqueness poorly merges with the fact that for Wilson physical reality is a major reference point for how mathematical opportunism and mathematical optimism perform in science. In order to get a grip on “reality” at all, some relationship between y and y* is wanted before any correlational measure obtains. Whatever steps the opportunist takes to arrive at such a parochial, problem-specific truth-condition, there is a need for critical evaluation of his mathematical steps or, in other words, the axiomatic method starts. 
What is at stake here is perhaps best illustrated by many applied mathematicians’ discomfort with ‘effective theories’ in physics. There one starts with an equation that contains one or more free parameters which are mutually adjusted in order to fit the data. Wilson alludes to such approaches by citing a procedure in which one predicts a rocket trajectory by pulling values from an empirical table and plugging them into Euler’s method; “all we need to assume is that some differential equation, of the required type and satisfying a Lipschitz condition, holds true of our rocket; we don’t need to know anything very concrete about the equation at all.” (Ibid., 386) Once again we need the Lipschitz condition to secure a correlational measure of trustworthiness and it is, to my mind, precisely its key role in the theory of differential equations which leaves us so much leeway about the equation. But if no concept of comparable mathematical depth is at hand, effective theories may operate rather blindly and “the unfolding reasoning process” arrange itself with many independent realities, such that empirical success becomes a trivial product of uncritical curve fitting. The non-uniqueness of the correlational measure might acquit any function fitting the data. Here a honest mathematical optimist must provide the opportunist with suitable conditions for the correctness proofs. Renormalization theory has taught us that this can lead to deep mathematics.
	Let me finally turn to the unified approach to reasoning advocated by Wilson. He suggests that “in contrast to the “absolutistic” attempts to support classical logic,… we should look at the soundness proofs of logic in this same provisional spirit” (Ibid., 392) as at “other forms of elaborate reasoning, such as the numerical schemes used to solve differential equations on computers” (Ibid., 372). If we are given sufficient structure to supply truth-conditions, then first-order logic can be trusted, but in other cases previously accepted logical inference can become untrustworthy.

Trusting the innocent looking principle that & implies , Newton argued that, since material substances display absolute accelerations, they must possess absolute velocities as well. But this is possible, for reasons, we need not explore, only if an underlying ‘absolute space” exists to render the notion of “velocity” meaningful. But, notoriously, no copies of any known material will behave differently just because they are assigned different velocities. Why is this so? The mathematician E. Cartan suggested that the underlying support for the language of Newtonian mechanics is actually a spacetime – that is a 4-dimensional unity where space and time blur together somewhat as they do in Relativity Theory. On Cartan’s treatment, a particular 4-dimensional gizmo supports the term “acceleration” in its typical classical employments, but nothing in Cartan’s spacetime stands behind “velocity” whenever the term strays outside of “fused” contexts like the definitions of “acceleration”. In other words, Cartan’s proposal removes the semantic support for the inference from & to  in exactly the contexts where Newton evoked the rule to argue for “absolute space”. (Ibid., 392f.) 

But this is not what the example shows in first place. To my mind, Cartan’s uniform geometrical formulation of classical and relativistic mechanics was an important instance of ‘deepening the foundations’ which teaches us that large part of the talk about absolute space becomes simply meaningless within a suitable conceptual framework that, in a very Neumannian sense, describes its own boundaries.​[8]​ Although it took a long time until Cartan calculus became widely known, it represents one of the cornerstones of today’s mathematical physics.
Let me conclude this paper with some comments about the role of logic within the present debate. Wilson holds that logical inference, even first-order logic, may become untrustworthy when the truth conditions parochial to the problem fail to support it. Logic thus appears to be on a par with other forms of elaborate reasoning. I doubt whether such a stand is necessary to gain space and win due respect for the opportunist’s shakily rationalized expedients in applied mathematics. In the opportunist mode advocated here, axiomatics is not subservient to a specific foundationalist stand. Even without being absolute in their foundations, mathematics and logic provide us with much more trustworthiness than any other science. It amounts to a misunderstanding of the axiomatic method – one that largely characterizes the views rightly criticized by Wilson – to make this unmatched reliability depend crucially on foundationalist arguments of physical or mathematical provenience. 
Aspiring to endow once shakily rationalized expedience with a well-based mathematical ontology, even the mathematical optimist’s logical commitments are thus, it seems, weaker than Wilson assumes. The choice between mathematical optimism and mathematical opportunism by itself, accordingly, does not entail strong foundationalist consequences. Or put differently, working mathematicians oscillating between both strategies do not lead a logical double life. In this way foundationalist problems are neither solved nor dissolved, they are just put aside for a more suitable moment. 
This is not to say, that foundationalist problems are irrelevant for axiomatics and the choice between mathematical opportunism and mathematical optimism. Take the relationship between ordinary logic and quantum logic. Certainly the latter is mathematically more general and isomorphic to the structure of a physical theory that is more fundamental than classical physics. But do we really have to choose right away whether the logical universe is first-order or quantum? 
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^1	  This appropriate distinction between the axiomatic method and Hilbert’s foundationalist program has been neglected for a long time until the recent renaissance of Hilbert research that substantially profits from the large body of lecture notes on physical topics. See (Corry, 1997) and (Majer, 2001) who shows that Hilbert applied his method both to phenomenological theories and to theories which he considered as final.
^2	  Cf. (Wigner, 1960, 7), or even stronger (Sneed, 1979).
^3	  For more information of Hilbert’s treatment of variational calculus, see (Thiele, 1997) and (Gray, 2000).
^4	  This is the reason why hardly any of the above-mentioned mathematical results about variational calculus has made its way into these textbooks.
^5	  The concept of “deepening the foundations” (Tieferlegung) is admittedly not very precise in Hilbert’s work; here it is treated as an umbrella term for a certain characteristic element both in his methodological writings and his concrete axiomatizations. (Stöltzner, 2001) argues that certain aspects of this concept were not palatable to Logical Empiricists because they violated the verificationist criterion of meaning.
^6	  In introductory textbooks this theorem is typically proven either by the convergence of an approximation algorithm or – as a bolt from the blue – by reference (without proof) to Schauder’s fixed point theorem.
^7	  This argument can already be found in the “Problems” (Hilbert, 1900, 444).
^8	  Here one might cite Malament’s (1995) results about Newtonian cosmology, which were formulated within the Cartan framework.
